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The Maghribi Industrialists: Contract Enforcement In The 





Original oral history data shows that during the import-substituting industrialisation, state 
capitalist period delimited by the independence in 1956 and the structural adjustment program 
in 1982, Moroccan manufacturers were operating in an environment characterised by a high risk 
of contractual breach, and by long-term, face-to-face relationships with few trade partners. The 
judicial system was seldom used to enforce contracts, because it was dysfunctional, and would 
break up a valuable relationship. To avoid contractual problems, entrepreneurs were largely 
relying on their acquaintances: economic life was embedded in social life. Social capital was 
derived from the business network and social connections rather than from connections with 
the state, kin-based and ethno-geographic groups. Private enforcement does not work as the 
Maghribi traders suggest. It is a way of screening customers and suppliers based on on-demand, 
reciprocal exchange of imprecise information, rather than a way of inflicting collective 
punishment. Its efficiency depends on the structure of the business network and on the 
individual social capital that agents hold within this structure. The institutional environment 
deteriorated after the period, because an increased number of players disrupted the structure of 
the business network and decreased the efficiency of private enforcement.  
 
  
                                                 
∗ In standard Arabic, Maghribi means Moroccan.  
Introduction 
For the last two decades, there has been a growing agreement among economists that 
the quality of institutions is a major determinant of the pace and pattern of economic 
development. Institutions enable economic development by protecting property rights and 
enforcing contracts. Which institutions matter is much less agreed upon. North’s seminal works 
originally focused on the rise of the Western world, and how formal institutions – namely 
impartial courts – enable economic growth by protecting property rights.1 
Shifting to other areas (eg. Asia) and other time-periods (eg. the Middle-Ages) led 
scholars to consider informal institutions, such as codes of behaviour or private judges.  Informal 
institutions opened interesting avenues for research and policy-making. In particular, Greif 
showed that the Maghribi traders, a coalition of Jewish merchants operating across the 12th-
century Mediterranean, successfully conducted overseas trade through an informal contract-
enforcement mechanism.2 This case-study became very popular because it showed that informal 
institutions – in this case, the threat of damaging a cheater’s reputation – can substitute for 
formal ones in effecting economic development, and that such institutions are deeply rooted in 
society, as they are sustained by social capital and cultural norms.  
However appealing they are in theory, the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of 
these informal institutions is mixed. Works that rely on qualitative analysis and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that they are very effective and widely relied upon contract-enforcement 
mechanisms. Works that rely on more systematic quantitative evidence suggest the opposite.3  
This paper investigates how contracts were enforced in Moroccan manufacturing from 
independence in 1956 to the structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1982. Apart from the fact 
that institutional economics has surprisingly paid little attention to the Middle East,4 Morocco 
during the period represents a particularly favourable case to assess the role of informal 
contract-enforcement institutions. First, several features suggest that informal institutions should 
be heavily relied upon to enforce contracts. Morocco’s largely inefficient judiciary leaves room 
for other enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, similarly to many countries in the region, 
Morocco experienced state capitalism and import-substituting industrialisation policies (ISI) 
during the period. Responding to government incentives, a small, socially-homogeneous elite 
                                                 
1 See North for a summary of his intellectual development. North, "Prologue," in The Frontiers of the New 
Institutional Economics. 
2 Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy : Lessons from Medieval Trade. 
3 See Section I for an extensive review of literature of the two sides of the argument.  
4 To my knowledge, the only institutional economics works that covered the Middle East are Kuran’s, for 
the pre-colonial period, and Benhassine’s, for the modern period. Benhassine ignores however informal 
institutions. Benhassine, From Privilege to Competition : Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle East 
and North Africa, Kuran, The Long Divergence : How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. 
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progressively took over manufacturing. This elite’s dense social ties give good reason to believe 
that it would devise informal contract-enforcement institutions. Second, the other social groups 
operating in manufacturing, namely Europeans, can be used as natural control groups.  
As the literature on Morocco does not cover contract enforcement, I used a wide array of 
sources – mostly Marxist economics, political science, and sociology – to derive several 
hypotheses on patterns of contract enforcement, the role of social capital, and institutional 
dynamics (Section II).5 Given the lack of data, I relied on oral history to collect original interview 
data from 33 manufacturers who were active during the period.6 Following oral history methods 
provided well-established guidelines to collect both interview and survey data and assess their 
reliability (Sections III and IV). Interview data was complemented by survey data in order to 
better contrast the two sides of the empirical debate. The hypotheses were then contrasted 
against the data (Sections V, VI, and VII). This, I argue, leads to a reconsideration of the workings 
of private enforcement.  
 
I. Theoretical And Empirical Background 
The theoretical rationale behind contract-enforcement institutions is that they mitigate 
what Greif calls the fundamental problem of exchange (FPOE).7 Trade is a quid pro quo. As 
exchange is sequential, there is a time-lapse between the quid and the quo. This time-lapse 
allows parties to renege on their contractual obligations. This is precisely FPOE: “one will not 
enter into an objectively profitable exchange relationship unless the other party can ex-ante 
commit to fulfil his contractual obligations ex-post”8. If the FPOE is not mitigated, exchange 
takes a rudimentary, cash-and-carry form. 
Institutions provide mechanisms that mitigate FPOE. They broadly fall into four categories: 
self-enforcement, moral norms, legal enforcement, and private enforcement.9 Self-enforcement 
constitutes the baseline mechanism because society is not taken into account. It mitigates FPOE 
by considering that exchange between the two parties is personalised and repeated. The game-
                                                 
5 Because of the extremely diverse disciplinary perspectives of the sources, and the imprecisions that result 
from the sometimes poor evidence they use, putting them together has been difficult. As the aim of this 
paper is very different from these sources, this paper may not fully due justice to their many subtleties. 
The most useful sources were Waterbury’s reference book on Moroccan politics; M.G. Berrada and 
Tangeaoui’s sociologies of the Moroccan entrepreneur. Berrada, "L'entrepreneur Marocain, Une Élite De 
Transition", Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, Waterbury, The 
Commander of the Faithful : The Moroccan Political Elite : A Study in Segmented Politics. 
6 Interview transcripts and data collected available upon request to the author.  
7 Greif, "The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis." 
8 Ibid., Cited Pages, 254. 
9 Fafchamps provides a theoretical model that brings together these mechanisms. See Fafchamps, "The 
Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana." 
theoretical literature sees trust and threat of retaliation as two sides of the same coin: the 
interaction is formalised as a repeated game with infinite time-horizon, where enforcement is 
guaranteed by tit-for-tat strategies.10 Repeated interaction allows parties to collect information 
about the trade partner, especially about his capability and willingness to comply. Enforcement 
is second-party in the sense that threat of retaliation deters cheating.11 Trust builds up precisely 
because of threat of retaliation.  
The other categories of mechanisms arise from taking society into account, and allow 
either first- or third-party enforcement. Moral norms allow first-party enforcement; they are 
produced by society and internalised by agents during their first and secondary socialisations. 
Internalisation ensures enforcement in the sense that feelings of shame or guilt ensure 
compliance to the rule.12 
Third-party enforcement differs according to whether the third-party is public or private. 
A public third-party corresponds to legal enforcement. There, enforcement is guaranteed by 
formal institutions that rely ultimately on the state’s monopoly over legitimate force. Actual use 
of force is generally not required: the shadow of law, i.e. the threat of actual legal action, is 
enough to induce compliance.  
The literature identified several problems with legal enforcement. First, and this is 
common to all third-party enforcement mechanisms, the asymmetry of information between the 
parties on the one hand, and the third-party on the other makes some dimensions of the 
relationship observable by the two parties, but not verifiable by the third-party. This limits the 
scope of third-party enforcement as unverifiable dimensions cannot be contracted upon, nor 
enforced.13 Second, threat of legal action may not be credible, when legal costs are too high 
compared to the amount at stake for instance. Legal enforcement then fails to induce 
compliance. Third, legal enforcement is a characteristic of developed economies, where 
“effective judicial systems include well-specified bodies of law and agents [lawyers, arbitrators, 
mediators], and one has some confidence that the merits of a case rather than private payoffs 
                                                 
10 See Telser, and Fundenberg and Maskin for good examples of such models. Fudenberg and Maskin, 
"The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.", Telser, "A 
Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements." 
11 North, "Comments," in Communities and Markets in Economic Development. 
12 Platteau, "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist - Part I: The Role of Public and Private 
Order Institutions.", Platteau, "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist - Part Ii: The Role of 
Moral Norms." 
13 This is also why contracts are incomplete. See Hart and Holmström, "The Theory of Contracts," in 
Advances in Economic Theory : Fifth World Congress, 128-48. 
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will influence outcomes”14. In developing economies, dysfunctional judicial systems prevent 
agents from using legal enforcement.15 
A private third-party corresponds to private enforcement. In this setting, exchange takes 
place within a community, and enforcement is provided by informal institutions, such as private 
arbitration or reputation. As for Greif’s Maghribi traders, repeated exchange within the 
community gives all agents a reputation. Cheaters are subjected to a coordinated punishment by 
all (or a subgroup of) other agents. Actual punishment is again not necessary: the threat of 
seeing one’s reputation undermined after cheating and punishment is sufficient.16 Dixit 
summarises the conditions under which reputation-based mechanisms ensure enforcement: (a) 
detecting deviation, transmitting the news of deviation to all members, and inflicting 
punishment must all be swift and accurate (otherwise, deterrence is less efficient); (b) 
community membership must be stable, i.e. members should not be able to exit after 
deviating.17 Finally, Li shows that private enforcement has small fixed costs, but high marginal 
costs of screening and monitoring additional members. Therefore, it becomes increasingly 
inefficient as the number of players increases.18 However, a private information-centralizing 
organization may mitigate this inefficiency. Law Merchant in Champagne fairs played such a 
role. It sustained private enforcement by centralising information about traders’ past transaction 
in a reduced form (whether they had outstanding judgments), and disclosing it to them at cost.19  
Private enforcement draws on social capital, which poses a theoretical difficulty. 
Considering repeated exchange within a community, or a business network, draws on economic 
sociology’s paradigm that exchange is embedded in a concrete, on-going system of social 
relations.20 Embeddedness led scholars to consider social capital. This concept has an individual 
and a collective meaning that both relate to private enforcement.21 Individual social capital is 
“the set of actual or potential resources that accrue from possession of a durable network of 
                                                 
14 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p. 54-60. 
15 This does not mean, however, that an effective judicial system automatically induces reliance on legal 
enforcement. Contrasting the UK to Germany and Italy, Deakin and Wilkinson show that a well-
functioning judicial system can in fact provide, in some circumstances, a foundation for trust, and, in turn, 
for self-enforcement. Deakin and Wilkinson, "Cooperation, Contract Law and Economic Performance," in 
The Role of Business Ethics in Economic Performance. 
16 See Greif’s Maghribi traders and Kandori for good examples of such mechanisms. Greif, Institutions and 
the Path to the Modern Economy : Lessons from Medieval Trade, Kandori, "Social Norms and Community 
Enforcement." 
17 Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics : Alternative Modes of Governance, p. 59-65. 
18 Li, "Relation-Based Versus Rule-Based Governance: An Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian 
Crisis." 
19 Milgrom, North, and Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, 
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." 
20 Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." 
21 Portes, "The Two Meanings of Social Capital." 
relationships”22. It facilitates contract-enforcement because one’s network yields informational 
benefits, notably about other agents’ past transactions. Collective social capital is “those 
features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”23. It facilitates contract-enforcement 
when the business network becomes the basis for joint punishment, or for the development of a 
“business culture” that promotes norms of good behaviour.24 The literature seldom addresses 
the difficulty that the two concepts differ to the point that they can sometimes be at odds. 
When one uses his contacts to be awarded a public contract, individual social capital is actually 
undermining collective social capital.  
However close institutional economics and economic sociology seem to be, they take a 
different stance on private enforcement, as economic sociology considers explicitly the business 
network’s structure. The network consists of firms linked together either through arm’s-length 
or embedded ties. Contrary to arm’s-length ties, embedded ties are long-term and allow trust 
and cooperation to build up. According to Uzzi, the determinant of performance is not the 
efficiency of various enforcement mechanisms but the structure. Performance is maximal when 
the network reaches optimal balance between the two types of ties. Otherwise, the network is 
either under-embedded (too many arm’s-length ties) or over-embedded (too many embedded 
ties). At the firm level, probability of failure is minimised when the firm reaches the optimal level 
of embeddedness.25 At the network level, an under-embedded network lacks the benefits of 
embedded ties; an over-embedded one may be put at risk by failure of a core player, or see its 
successful firms turn into “relief organisations” that subsidise unsuccessful ones at the expense 
of expanding their own capacities.26 
Finally, deficient contract enforcement mechanisms may lead to vertical integration. 
Building on Coase’s original insight on the boundaries of the firm, Williamson highlighted how 
transaction-specific investments lead to hold-up problems.27 Property rights theory of the firm 
explains why hold-up leads to integration: as ownership of assets is a source of power when 
contracts are incomplete, the acquiring firm’s incentive to make the relationship-specific 
investment increases after integration.28 Lamoreaux et al. bring together boundaries of the firm 
                                                 
22 Bourdieu, "Le Capital Social." 
23 Putnam, Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 167. 
24 Fafchamps, Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa : Theory and Evidence. 
25 Uzzi, "The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of 
Organizations: The Network Effect." 
26 Uzzi, "Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness," in The 
Sociology of Economic Life. 
27 Coase, "The Nature of the Firm.", Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism : Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. 
28 Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. 
7 
 
and contract enforcement: hold-up problems can be solved by various coordination 
mechanisms, ranging from pure hierarchy to pure market exchange, with long-term 
relationships in between. The mechanism that is chosen is the one that mitigates hold-up best.29 
Therefore, integration should happen if the abovementioned contract enforcement mechanisms 
are not efficient. 
Empirical works focused on determining which of the above contract-enforcement 
mechanisms are actually used to enforce contracts when legal enforcement is deficient. After 
Macaulay’s first insight on patterns of contract-enforcement in the US, these works covered 
mostly three fields: economic history, with works such as Greif’s Maghribi traders, the 
Champagne fairs, or Edo-Japan merchant coalitions (kabu nakama); developing countries, with 
works covering Africa, Latin America, India and China; and transition economies, with works on 
Poland and Russia.30  
The conclusions these works reach depend on the methodology used.31 Qualitative works 
use mostly anecdotal evidence or archives, such as the Maghribi traders’ correspondence. They 
                                                 
29 Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin, "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American 
Business History," 3-12. 
30 Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study." For economic history works, 
see Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy : Lessons from Medieval Trade, Milgrom, 
North, and Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, 
and the Champagne Fairs.", Okazaki, "The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Pre-Modern Japanese 
Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis." For developing countries, see Banerjee and 
Duflo, "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry.", 
Bigsten et al., "Contract Flexibility and Dispute Resolution in African Manufacturing..", Fafchamps, 
Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa : Theory and Evidence, Kähkönen et al., "Contracting Practices 
in an African Economy: Industrial Firms and Suppliers in Tanzania.", Redding, The Spirit of Chinese 
Capitalism, Woodruff, "Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization in Mexico's Footwear Industry.", 
Yu and Zhang, "Adaptive Efficiency and Financial Development in China: The Role of Contracts and 
Contractual Enforcement." For transition economies, see Beckmann and Boger, "Courts and Contract 
Enforcement in Transition Agriculture: Theory and Evidence from Poland.", Greif and Kandel, "Contract 
Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia," in Economic Transition in 
Eastern Europe and Russia : Realities of Reform, Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman, "The Law Works in 
Russia: The Role of Legal Institutions in the Transactions of Russian Enterprises," in Assessing the Value of 
Law in Transition Economies.  
31 For qualitative works, see Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy : Lessons from 
Medieval Trade, Greif and Kandel, "Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current 
Status in Russia.", Milgrom, North, and Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The 
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.", Okazaki, "The Role of the Merchant Coalition 
in Pre-Modern Japanese Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis.", Redding, The Spirit 
of Chinese Capitalism, Woodruff, "Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization in Mexico's Footwear 
Industry.", Yu and Zhang, "Adaptive Efficiency and Financial Development in China: The Role of Contracts 
and Contractual Enforcement." For quantitative works, see Banerjee and Duflo, "Reputation Effects and 
the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry.", Beckmann and Boger, "Courts and 
Contract Enforcement in Transition Agriculture: Theory and Evidence from Poland.", Bigsten et al., 
"Contract Flexibility and Dispute Resolution in African Manufacturing..", Fafchamps, Market Institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa : Theory and Evidence, Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman, "The Law Works in Russia: 
The Role of Legal Institutions in the Transactions of Russian Enterprises.", Kähkönen et al., "Contracting 
Practices in an African Economy: Industrial Firms and Suppliers in Tanzania." 
suggest that private enforcement is very effective and widely relied upon. Edwards and Ogilvie’s 
reappraisal of some of these works casts doubt on these conclusions: to them, the Maghribi 
traders were in fact using self-enforcement, and contract enforcement in Champagne fairs was 
in fact done through public-order institutions.32 Quantitative works reach a similar conclusion: 
legal enforcement is indeed seldom used, first because a dysfunctional judicial system makes it 
too costly, and second because it breaks-up valuable long-term relationships. Private 
enforcement, however, plays a rather insignificant role, and agents mostly rely on self-
enforcement.  
 
II. Morocco: Industrial Policy, Components Of The Economic Elite, 
Hypotheses On Contract Enforcement Patterns 
A. Industrial Policy: The Protected Economy 
From independence in 1956 to SAP in 1982, Morocco gradually set up an industrial policy 
that individualises the period. This policy was threefold: import-substituting industrialisation, 
indigenisation and state capitalism.33 In the late 1950s, the government promoted the expansion 
of local private enterprise, and instituted a protectionist trade regime. The 1958 and 1960 
investment codes promoted indigenous industrial growth through fiscal incentive, while a 
modification of the treaty of Algeciras in 1957 instituted trade barriers. Protectionism 
consolidated progressively throughout the period, especially during the 1970s. Local import 
duties rose steadily, ranging from 50 to 200% for certain consumer goods in the late 1970s. 
This was accompanied, in the 1970s, by overvaluation of the dirham and imposition of licences 
on imports. The 1973 Moroccanisation indigenised the economy. It stipulated majority 
ownership by Moroccan nationals of companies based on Moroccan soil in the secondary and 
tertiary sector. Although the regime had a rather liberal, pro-private sector ideology, its public 
sector took an increasingly large role in the economy. State-control took the form of direct 
ownership of a few key sectors – such as Cherifian Phosphates Office (OCP) for the phosphates’ 
rent – and mostly equity positions through public holding companies – such as Industrial 
Development Office (ODI) or National Investment Company (SNI). 
 
                                                 
32 Edwards and Ogilvie, "Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders 
Reappraised.", Edwards and Ogilvie, "What Lessons for Economic Development Can We Draw from the 
Champagne Fairs?." 
33 Cammett, Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa : A Comparative Perspective, p. 80-
103, Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 201-2. 
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B. Components of the Economic Elite 
The protected economy favoured the consolidation of an economic elite. 
Neopatrimonalist analysis describes the process: in order to ensure its stability, the 
neopatrimonial monarchy distributes various rents (political, economic …) to some groups to 
constitute a clientele.34 The groups that captured these rents in manufacturing became 
Morocco’s economic elite.35  
The first component of the economic elite is the grandes familles from Fes, Fassi families. 
Fes was the capital city of pre-protectorate Morocco, a major hub for caravan trade, and an 
important cultural centre. At the time, Fassi families were already enjoying significant power, 
and were closely tied to the state. During the protectorate, a great part moved to new cities 
(principally Casablanca). They concentrated wealth by intermarriages and better access to 
business opportunities, but still derived most of their income from trade. Forming the bulk of 
Istiqlal (the nationalist party), they sided with the Palace in the anticolonial struggle, as they 
expected the independent state to favour their interests. After independence, they started 
investing in the light industry, as their overlap with upper-level bureaucracy granted them 
privileged access to the state incentives for industrialisation. Investment targeted mostly 
construction, food-processing, and textiles, because of a built-in consumer demand and previous 
experience in the textile trade, dating back from pre-protectorate times.36 Moroccanisation 
enabled them to consolidate their holdings, while encouraging the formation of large family-
based business groups. Indeed, banks favoured large capital holders from prominent families 
when granting credit to purchase Moroccanised companies.37  
The second component of the economic elite is upper-level bureaucracy. State capitalism 
bolstered the creation of a state bourgeoisie.38 Ministers, high government officials, and heads 
of parastatals first entered manufacturing as managers of public companies. They definitively 
joined the economic elite during Moroccanisation. Indeed, their position allowed them to set-up, 
                                                 
34 Leca and Schemeil, "Clientélisme Et Patrimonialisme Dans Le Monde Arabe." 
35 Naming this group is difficult. Pre-1990s works refer to it as a rentier, or a non-bourgeois bourgeoisie.  
From the 1990s onwards, terminology becomes more evasive. Some refer to it as an economic elite; 
others as the dominant subset of a wider group of entrepreneurs. What should be clear is that within 
industrial entrepreneurs, the literature sees a dominated and a dominant group. I refer to the latter as the 
economic elite. See Belal for rentier bourgeoisie; El Malki for non-bourgeois bourgeoisie; Benhaddou for 
economic elite; Catusse, Kaioua and Tangeaoui for entrepreneurs. Belal, Développement Et Facteurs Non-
Économiques, Benhaddou, Maroc : Les Élites Du Royaume, Essai Sur L'organisation Du Pouvoir Au Maroc, 
Catusse, Le Temps Des Entrepreneurs. Politique Et Transformations Du Capitalisme Au Maroc, p. 9-38, El 
Malki, Trente Ans D'économie Marocaine : 1960-1990, Kaioua, Casablanca : L'industrie Et La Ville, 
Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité. 
36 Berrada, "L'entrepreneur Marocain, Une Élite De Transition", Kaioua, Casablanca : L'industrie Et La Ville. 
37 Berrada, "La Marocanisation De 1973 : Éclairage Rétrospectif." 
38 Waterbury, "Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?." 
join or sponsor private firms owing their welfare to governmental beneficence and 
benevolence.39 
Trade liberalisation after 1982 began a new period, as new opportunities in global 
markets disrupted the industrial tissue. While the most fragile companies of the formerly-
protected sectors failed, many newcomers entered the industry.40 These newcomers were 
younger and from much more diverse social and professional trajectories, including well-
educated entrepreneurs promoting more modern and rationalised management methods.41 
According to Tangeaoui, the new period was marked by an erosion of group solidarities, an 
increasing disrespect of one’s word, and a loss of trust between individuals. He relates this to 
the rise of the modern, individualistic society that the more educated entrepreneurs embody.42 
 
C. Hypotheses on Patterns of Contract Enforcement 
First, legal enforcement should play a minor role. Morocco has often been analysed as an 
authoritarian weak state.43 If it promulgates laws, the weak state does not enforce them, or 
enforce them selectively, either because they are bogged by flaws or because it uses them as a 
device of power. Businessmen are therefore suspicious towards the legal system.44 The 
Moroccan legal system suffered from inconsistent laws, because of the overlap of three judicial 
orders with different logics (customary, Islamic, and modern).45 For commercial law in particular, 
property rights were poorly enforced by norms dating back to the protectorate until the reform 
of Code of commerce in 1996.46 Quality of enforcement also decreased. First, arabisation of the 
judiciary in 1965 dragged an ever-less well-trained personnel to the judiciary. Second, the 
                                                 
39 Ben Ali, "Etat Et Reproduction Sociale Au Maroc : Le Cas Du Secteur Public.", Waterbury, The 
Commander of the Faithful : The Moroccan Political Elite : A Study in Segmented Politics., p. 130-3. 
40 Cammett, Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa : A Comparative Perspective, p. 99-
103. 
41 Kaioua, Casablanca : L'industrie Et La Ville, p. 240-66, Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : 
Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, p. 71-96. 
42 Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, p. 71-96. 
43 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World. 
44 Gobe, Les Hommes D'affaires Égyptiens : Démocratisation Et Secteur Privé Dans L'egypte De L'infitâh, p. 
221-55. 
45 Bouderbala and Pascon, "Le Droit Et Le Fait Dans La Société Composite - Essai D'introduction Au 
Système Juridique Marocain.", Hibou and Tozy, "Une Lecture D'anthropologie Politique De La Corruption 
Au Maroc : Fondement Historique D'une Prise De Liberté Avec Le Droit." 
46 Elbacha, "Rapport Sur L’état D’avancement De La Construction D’un Cadre Juridique Du 
Développement Humain Et Des Processus De Réformes Législatives Et Réglementaires Liés À 
L’encouragement Du Développement Général Et Humain En Particulier, Y Compris : Droit Des Affaires, 




budget steadily decreased. Third, a series of reforms of court system in 1974 drastically limited 
the right to a fair trial.47  
Second, and in line with moral norms enforcement, businessmen should have high moral 
standards. Indeed, from hypothesis 1, businessmen’s morality should be higher than that of 
lawyers’. Furthermore, M.G. Berrada and Bégot state that businessmen were ashamed to file for 
bankruptcy and not to honour their debts, which is consistent with first-party enforcement.48  
Third, businessmen’s moral standards should decrease after the period, while reliance on 
contracts and legal enforcement should increase. This stems from the dynamics outlined in the 
preceding subsection: the new generation of entrepreneurs was promoting more modern 
management methods, and trust decreased.  
Fourth, private enforcement should play a major role. The economic elite forms a small, 
socially homogeneous group, with a strong group consciousness and dense commercial, marital 
and social ties.49 Belal estimates it to 300 families.50 Repeated transactions within such a small 
and densely connected group should favour private enforcement. Evidence of business practices 
from other Arab countries supports this hypothesis: the Arab executive often uses personal ties 
and connections for conducting business, notably “knowing about, negotiating and eventually 
securing a multi-million dollar business contract”;51 for conflict-management, open 
confrontation is taboo, and “values and norms dictate the use of a third-party to convey the 
message of rejection”.52 
Fifth, social capital should be derived from connections with the state, kin-based groups, 
and ethno-geographic groups. Regarding connections with the state, the weak state gives birth 
to crony capitalism, where “businessmen and bureaucrats ally in cabals to seek mutual benefit 
by influencing the pattern of state intervention in the economy”.53 There is a wide consensus 
that this pattern applied to Morocco.54 Regarding kin-based groups, we discussed that the 
                                                 
47 Ghazali, "Le Processus De Réforme Et De Mise À Niveau De La Justice Et Les Réformes Dédiées À 
Assurer Le Règne De La Loi," in 50 Ans De Développement Humain & Perspectives 2025. 
48 Bégot, "Les Industries Textiles À Casablanca.", Berrada, "L'entrepreneur Marocain, Une Élite De 
Transition". 
49 Benhaddou, Maroc : Les Élites Du Royaume, Essai Sur L'organisation Du Pouvoir Au Maroc, p. 27-35; 
56-71, Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful : The Moroccan Political Elite : A Study in Segmented 
Politics., p. 94-128. 
50 Belal, Développement Et Facteurs Non-Économiques, p. 53-64. 
51 Muna, The Arab Executive, p. 74-78. 
52 Ibid., Cited Pages, 63-70.  
53 Sadowski, Political Vegetables? : Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian 
Agriculture, p. 140. 
54 Brachet provides an enlightening example: in 1974, SIMEF, a motors-producing company was founded 
in Fes with public capital. Its rapid growth threatened private interests linked to motors imports, and tied 
to a former Prime Minister and several members of the royal family. In 1982, SIMEF saw its import licence 
economic elite was characterised by dense marital ties. Family firms loomed large in Moroccan 
capitalism, especially in manufacturing.55 Finally, kin-based solidarities played a major role in 
mobilising capital for industrial investment.56 This suggests that agents should trade more with 
members of their extended family, as this would reduce enforcement costs. Regarding ethno-
geographic groups, Leveau highlighted the political and economic rivalry between Fassis and 
Soussis, a subgroup of Berbers.57 Soussis were originally associated with petty trade, and 
wholesale and retail trade in foodstuffs. They progressively entered the industry, often through 
bureaucracy. The Fassi-Soussi rivalry supposedly extended to manufacturing, where Fassi groups 
would compete against Soussi ones.58 This suggests that people should trade more with 
members of their ethno-geographic group, as this would reduce enforcement costs.  
Sixth, contrarily to the property-rights rationale, vertical integration should not decrease 
enforcement problems. Moroccan business groups were characterised by a low level of intra-
group transactions, except OCP for public groups and ONA for private groups.59 As Williamson 
suggested for conglomerates, rather than minimizing hold-up problems, their purpose was more 
to act as an internal capital market, because they allow better access to information and 
capital.60 Box I recaps the hypotheses. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
withdrawn. On the basis that the company was not anymore able to supply its customers, a licence was 
granted to a private company including these private interests to import motors from the UK and West 
Germany. Brachet, Corruption Et Sous-Développement Au Maroc, p. 95-6. See also Ben Ali, "Etat Et 
Reproduction Sociale Au Maroc : Le Cas Du Secteur Public.", Kaioua, "Les Grosses Fortunes Économiques 
Et Industrielles À Casablanca.", Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime." 
55 Saâdi, Les Groupes Financiers Au Maroc, p. 111-28. 
56 Berrada, "L'entrepreneur Marocain, Une Élite De Transition". 
57 Leveau, Le Fellah Marocain : Défenseur Du Trône, p. 83-9. 
58 Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, p. 146-55, Waterbury, The 
Commander of the Faithful : The Moroccan Political Elite : A Study in Segmented Politics., p. 133-8. 
59 Saâdi, Les Groupes Financiers Au Maroc, p. 97-110; 40-53. 






Hypotheses on patterns of contract enforcement 
 
III. Research Methodology 
Evidence of contracting practices was obtained from oral histories of 33 managers or 
high-ranking executives of companies operating in the Moroccan industry during the period (see 
Table A in Appendix). Small sample size was compensated by the richness of the collected data. 
Interviews were guided by the conceptual framework outlined in Section I.  Questions were 
asked on the contractual problems firms encounter with customers and suppliers, to avoid 
biases resulting from firms’ reluctance to speak about contractual problems in which they are at 
fault. For customers, questions focused on non- and late payment problems. For suppliers, they 
focused on non-delivery, late delivery, and deficient quality of supplied goods (see questionnaire 
in Appendix).  
Data collection complied with widely accepted methodological principles for oral history.61 
I contacted each respondent by phone after having been recommended by several persons. This 
proved essential, as for otherwise the respondent is distrustful or in a hurry. The study was 
conducted in two phases. A pilot study in December 2010 involved 6 respondents. Sessions 
lasted about 1h each and consisted of open-ended interviews complemented by survey 
questionnaires. Phase two, in April 2011, involved 27 respondents. Sessions lasted about 45min, 
                                                 
61 Howarth, Oral History : A Handbook, Yow, Recording Oral History : A Guide for the Humanities and 
Social Sciences. 
H1. Legal enforcement should play a minor role. 
H2. Businessmen should have high moral standards during 
the period. 
H3. After the period, businessmen’s moral standards should 
decrease, while reliance on contracts and legal enforcement 
should increase. 
H4. Private enforcement should play a major role. 
H5. Social capital should be derived from connections with 
the state, kin-based groups, and ethno-geographic groups. 
H6. Vertical integration should not decrease enforcement 
and were divided in three parts: first, a survey questionnaire about the respondent and the 
company; second, a moderately directive interview about contractual problems, and ways to 
respond to them; third, a survey questionnaire about the same issues, to collect quantitative 
data, and to probe respondents on what they said in part 2.  
Respondents were recruited by snowballing. Because of the time lapse with the period 
under study, and lack of data on entrepreneurial activities during the period, industrial 
entrepreneurs form a hidden population, from which a random sample cannot be drawn. 
Snowballing allowed the quick finding of people that were unknown, in a group that is difficult 
to approach. 
Snowballing has two major drawbacks: first, a small, non-random sample severely 
restricts the array of statistical models that can be used; second, it induces a selection bias. 
Selection on explanatory variables concerns, at least, people with more social capital, as subjects 
with large personal networks are likely to be oversampled, and people belonging to particular 
ethno-geographic categories, namely Fassis and Europeans, as the first people included the 
sample influence the sample’s final composition. However, selection on explanatory variables 
does not cause inference problems; it only restricts the generality of the conclusions we may 
draw.62 There is no a priori reason to believe that sampling involved selection on dependent 
variables (use of a particular enforcement mechanism, outcome of contractual disputes). If 
selection on a dependent variable occurred, it would target subjects that rely more on private 
enforcement, which is not a major problem, as we want to assess the use of private 
enforcement in the most favourable setting. 
Oral history’s methodological principles helped circumvent biases resulting from deficient 
memory. First, we retain what is important to us.63 As commercial problems are an important 
matter to the company’s survival, and to the manager’s daily life, they are likely to be well-
remembered. Second, “memories of late adolescence and young adulthood are remarkably 
resistant to diminution”64, and during the period, all subjects were young adults. Third, 
questionnaires were designed in such a way as to circumvent memory issues. The period is 
delimited by events – independence and SAP – that had an obvious impact on the subjects’ 
professional life. Questions about dates were limited to major events in the subject’s life such as 
when he entered the company and when he left it. General questions about the company were 
limited to key indicators the respondent was asked about during his whole career (number of 
employees …), and were therefore well-remembered. Finally, for evident reasons of accuracy, a 
                                                 
62 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, p. 128-
39. 
63 Yow, Recording Oral History : A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences, p. 38. 
64 Ibid., Cited Pages, 39. 
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generalist approach was adopted (focus on main customers, ways of dealing with a typical 
problem), rather than the case-study approach often adopted in the quantitative literature (focus 
on the last occurrence of contractual dispute). Nevertheless, memory issues cannot be totally 
avoided, and figures especially are to be taken with a healthy level of suspicion. Furthermore as 
we compare firms from slightly different time-periods, it is rather difficult to aggregate results. 
Given the drawbacks of snowballing and oral history, collected evidence was cross-
referenced as much as possible, and was compared to available statistics averaged over the 
period.  
 
IV. The Data 
What follows presents the sample, and compares it with available data to identify the 
dimensions along which it is biased. Firm-level data is compared to data on industrial structure.65 
As no quantitative data is available to compare it to, individual-level data is compared to the 
patterns identified in the literature (see Section II.B).  
Sample dynamics is a major difficulty, a population of firms that enter and leave the 
sample at different times, and of interviewees that enter and leave each firm at different times. 
Figure I gets around this difficulty by plotting against time firm-level and individual-level sample 
sizes. Two third of sample firms were created before the independence; the number of firms 
peaks in 1978. 3 respondents witnessed the independence while working in sample firms, 19 
witnessed Moroccanisation, and 29 witnessed SAP. The period best covered is 1966 onwards, as 
more than half the respondents were working in sample firms. (See Table 1)  
Firms’ age suggests that the sample is plagued by survivor bias (Figure I). The average firm 
was founded in 1947; it was 35 years old in 1982. Hannah defines survivor bias as the fact that 
“our current knowledge of survivors dominates our impression of the typical experience, and 
their triumphs are lionised, while the history of the failures is forgotten or considered 
untypical”66. As no statistics on firms’ creation/destruction is available to compare the sample to, 
the bias’ magnitude cannot be assessed. However, unusually high survival rates suggest that it 
may seriously affect the results. Indeed, 85% of sample firms were alive in 1982; two thirds in 
                                                 
65 Unfortunately, there are only three industrial censuses from the period: one from 1970, the others from 
1978 and 1980. The 1970 census was not available in Casablanca, Paris nor London. Direction de 
l'industrie, "Situation Des Industries De Transformation : Année 1978.", Direction de l'industrie, 
"Situation Des Industries De Transformation : Année 1980 : Résultats De L'enquête Réalisée En 1981 ", 
Direction de l'industrie, "Situation Des Industries De Transformation En 1970." 
66 Hannah, "Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest": Were "Giant Redwoods" Different?," in 
Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries 254-7. 
2000. Hannah’s solution – examining the evolution of a population of firms defined ex-ante – 
cannot be implemented in this setting. The bias will be taken into account by systematically 
comparing outcomes between firms that were closed and firms that were open in 2000. (see 
Table 2) 
The sample is fairly representative of sectorial distribution, but over-represents large firms 
from Casablanca. Table I shows that the four sectors are fairly well represented. Casablanca was 
indeed dominating the industry, but the sample overstates this dominance. The sample is also 
biased towards large firms. Sample firms range from 10 to 1000 employees; the median firm is 
150 employees. These biases will be taken into account by systematically comparing outcomes 
between Casablanca and other regions, and between SMEs (10 to 150 employees) and large 
firms (150+ employees).  
The sample over-represents Moroccan firms and private firms (Table II). Discussing 
ownership is difficult, as data is very scarce and patterns change drastically over time, because of 
Moroccanisation and a decreasing role of the state.67 I address the difficulty by averaging out the 
data over the period. Comparison remains crude, because aggregate amounts of capital are 
compared to a number of firms that have some foreign or state capital. However, the sample 
slightly overrepresents Moroccan firms, and clearly overrepresents private firms. As previous, 
outcomes will be systematically compared between Moroccan and foreign firms on the one 
hand; private and public firms on the other hand. (See Figure 2) 
Respondents’ age range from 57 to 92; the median respondent is 70 (Figure II). On 
average, respondents entered sample firms in 1968 and left in 1997, after an average 29-years 
career. 
Jews and Berbers are under-represented. The literature suggests that the relevant ethno-
geographic categories are Fassis, Soussis, Jews and Europeans.68 Table III shows that the sample 
has a majority of Arabs. It also has no Moroccan Jew, and a minority of Berbers. Even if this is 
consistent with Berbers’ late entry into manufacturing, such a small share suggests they may be 
underrepresented.69 Among Arabs, Fassis are an overwhelming majority.  
                                                 
67 For Moroccan-foreign ownership, I use Berrada’s data, which comes from unpublished documents; for 
public-private ownership, I use El Malki’s data. Berrada, "La Marocanisation De 1973 : Éclairage 
Rétrospectif," p. 68, El Malki, L'économie Marocaine : Bilan D'une Décennie [1970-1980], p. 175. 
68 See Section II for Fassis, Soussis and Europeans. For Jews, see Geertz, "Suq: The Bazaar Economy in 
Sefrou," in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society : Three Essays in Cultural Analysis. 
69 Data on ethnicity is not available. Tangeaoui cites a survey on industrial ownership and ethnicity. 
Unfortunately, this survey is not reliable. Indeed, it only considers Fassi and Soussi ownerships, which is 
conceptually wrong since these categories are respectively an ethno-geographic group and an ethnic 
subgroup, and do not exhaust the ethno-geographic structure of the population. This survey and M.G. 
Berrada’s sample suggest however that the sample may overstate Arab dominance on industrial 
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The sample is very educated (Table III). 6 respondents did not complete secondary 
education; the remainders had 4 years of higher education. To make a conservative estimate, 
assume that subjects who did not complete secondary education are illiterate. The sample’s 
literacy rate is then 81%, much higher than the national literacy rate (30.3% in 1982). The 
sample is also much more educated than Tangeaoui’s.70 (See Table 3) 
Finally, among the types of entrepreneurs identified in Section II.B, Fassis, bureaucrats and 
the educated new generation are well represented. The typical path of a Fassi respondent was 
to help out his father in the family firm, sometimes since early childhood, then to inherit the 
business. “Since I was 10, I was already getting in touch with customers, during weekends. 
Aside from that, I was studying. Because tradition was that the eldest son would take over his 
father’s business.” The family firm was generally selling imported goods on the local market, 
and shifted to industrial production in the 1960s. Bureaucrats typically began their career as civil 
servants or senior executives of public companies. They entered manufacturing in the 1970s 
with the long-held ambition of becoming, and Moroccanisation opened up opportunities to buy 
out a business. “During every step of my career in civil service, I never accepted to be a civil 
servant because the idea of moving to the private sector was always at the back of my mind.” 
The educated new generation was tested by dividing the sample in two cohorts according to 
median birth year. A significantly different entry time in the sample supports the existence of 
two generations (Table IV). There is little quantitative evidence for a difference in human 
capital, the test being significant at the 10% level, but this may be due to small sample size.  
The sample is biased in favour of large, successful private firms from Casablanca. 
Entrepreneurs are a very educated group comprising of mostly Arabs and Europeans. Clearly, 
the sample does not give an accurate picture of industrial entrepreneurs as a whole. However, it 
does represent well the two core components of the economic elite (Fassis and bureaucrats) on 
the one hand, and foreign entrepreneurs on the other hand, which gives a usable control group.  
 
V. Patterns of Contract Enforcement 
A. Relationships With Clients And Suppliers 
Table V depicts the way firms handle their clients and suppliers. Three quarters of 
surveyed firms sell at least part of their output to end-users of their products such as 
manufacturers and consumers; the rest is sold primarily to wholesalers and retailers. Two thirds 
                                                                                                                                                        
ownership. Berrada, "L'entrepreneur Marocain, Une Élite De Transition", Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs 
Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, p. 147. 
70 Tangeaoui, Les Entrepreneurs Marocains : Pouvoir, Société Et Modernité, p. 314. 
of sample firms trade with publicly owned entities. This is higher than in Bigsten et al., and 
consistent with state capitalism.71 Consistently with ISI, sample firms export a small share of their 
output. A written contract is used in less than half the sales to clients. Relations with clients are 
long-term: sample firms deal on average 10 years with their clients, which is also higher than in 
Bigsten et al.  
Regarding suppliers, firms import on average 42% of their input. Consistently with ISI, 
this is higher than exports. 42% of the firms deal with at least one monopolistic supplier, and 
more than 20% have public companies as suppliers. These two figures are higher than in 
Bigsten et al. Firms are also more loyal to their suppliers than in Bigsten et al.: on average, they 
deal more than 10 years with their suppliers, and do not have many – half the sample has less 
than 16 suppliers. Altogether, this is consistent with state capitalism, where pubic companies 
play an important role, and with small, highly concentrated markets. Business relationships with 
suppliers are more formalised than with clients, as more than half the firms have a written 
agreement with their suppliers. This is because relations with foreign firms are usually more 
formalised, and sample firms have more relationships with foreign firms for imports than for 
exports.  
 
B. Incidence Of Contractual Breach, Contract Enforcement Mechanisms And 
Effectiveness 
Contractual disputes with clients and suppliers are a widespread problem (Table VI). For 
instance, almost every firm experienced late payment. Similarly to other studies, non-payment is 
experienced by fewer firms, and less frequently; late delivery and deficient quality are also 
widespread and roughly as frequent. Similarly to Fafchamps, non-delivery is rather infrequent.72  
Figure III shows that the ranking of the use of different contract-enforcement mechanisms 
is consistent with the quantitative literature: first and foremost, self-enforcement; then, far 
behind, shadow of law and legal enforcement; then, private enforcement. Legal enforcement 
does play a minor role compared to self-enforcement; hypothesis 1 is verified. Hypothesis 4 
however is seemingly dismissed, as private enforcement seems to play a minor role. Section VI 
qualifies this conclusion. The fact that shadow of law is immediately followed by legal 
enforcement suggests that if the threat of taking legal action is credible, shadow of law is not 
followed by legal enforcement; if it is not, legal action follows. As one respondent puts it: “if 
you don’t start anything, the guy won’t bother. If you drag him to legal action, he’ll be forced to 
                                                 
71 Bigsten et al., "Contract Flexibility and Dispute Resolution in African Manufacturing.," p. 9. 
72 Ibid., Cited Pages, Fafchamps, "The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana.", Kähkönen et al., 
"Contracting Practices in an African Economy: Industrial Firms and Suppliers in Tanzania." 
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get a lawyer, to do stuff. So at that point, he’ll be bothered.”  Private arbitration deserves 
special attention. It is seldom used because it was largely non-existent at the time. The few 
surveyed that used it were members of CGEM, a major business association that pushed this 
mode of conflict resolution. Finally, Figure III suggests that enforcement has different patterns 
for customers and suppliers. The next subsection discusses this at more length.  
The dispute’s outcome depends on its gravity (Table VI). Respondents are usually satisfied 
with the outcome of little problems – late payment, late delivery and deficient quality –, and 
trade generally resumes. For big problems – non-payment, non-delivery –, satisfaction and 
chances for trade to resume both drop. When breaking the relationship, respondents distinguish 
between excusable default and bad type, i.e. deliberate cheating: if the partner is of a good 
type, default is excusable because it is due to exogenous factors, and the firm is willing to share 
the commercial risk; If the customer is of a bad type, the relationship breaks: “You have clients 
who are honest and sincere. Once all debts are cleared up, I can resume credit on a new basis. 
But when you feel that the client is dishonest – for instance, he cashes the money instead of 
paying his debts, or he invests it on land … This is a little disappointment. You manage the thing 
the best you can, till you get all your money back, then you switch to cash payment.” 
 
C. Patterns 
A series of simple tests (chi-2 and Fisher’s exact test) were used in order to identify 
patterns of contract enforcement, as sample properties banned using more sophisticated 
statistical models (see Table VII for a summary of the main results). Results are only indicative, 
least because theydo not measure the effect of a given variable ceteris paribus. For this reason, 
the significant relationships identified by statistical tests are complemented with interview data. 
What follows presents in turn the determinants of dispute occurrence, of the use of different 
mechanisms, and of dispute outcome. 
Surprisingly, the only significant determinant of dispute occurrence is generational: the 
new generation is more likely to face disputes; either because it is less lenient about contractual 
problems, or because the institutional environment degraded with time (see Section VII).  
Contract-enforcement mechanisms are used in correlation to each other (Table B in 
Appendix). Shadow of law, legalistic, and private enforcements are positively correlated. This 
suggests that if self-enforcement cannot solve a dispute, a package of all other enforcement 
methods is used. Inaction is negatively correlated to legal enforcement and shadow of law. This 
suggests that big problems lead to legal enforcement: “someone who doesn’t pay his cheque … 
if we can’t solve the problem by reaching an amicable agreement, we are forced to go to 
court.” 
Failed firms are more likely to do nothing after a dispute. They are also less likely to use 
legal and private enforcement. This suggests that it is inability to act that induced failure: “a 
company that has very frequent payment problems ends up closing. It’s as simple as that.” For 
instance, a sample firm had an Iraqi customer that defaulted because of Iran-Iraq war. The 
sample firm’s export insurance refused to cover the default. Unable to recover its money, it filed 
for bankruptcy.  
As nearly everyone uses self-enforcement, interview data rather than quantitative analysis 
is used to identify its determinants. Renegotiation seems to be used when lock-in is high and 
bargaining power is even: “we split the credit payments such that the client wouldn’t be totally 
penalised and such that we wouldn’t lose. There’s two things you’ve got to keep in mind, it’s 
that we wanted to keep the client for the future, and that we wanted to get our money back.” 
Conversely, withholding future supplies is used when bargaining power is high: “the demand 
for my products was so high that they needed them. They had to pay. To get some new, they 
must pay. [sic.]” 
Firms located in Casablanca are more likely to use shadow of law and legal enforcement. 
First, firms may have better access to the judiciary system in large cities such as Casablanca. 
Second, as the business network is bigger in these large cities, the information it provides may 
be less accurate, which makes problems more acute, and forces firms to use legal enforcement. 
After a dispute, two outcomes are of interest: is the firm satisfied? Does the relationship 
break up? In line with the quantitative literature, firms are less likely to be satisfied and less likely 
to resume the relationship after using legal enforcement. Unsatisfying outcomes seem to be due 
to cumbersome procedures, and unenforced rather than unfair decisions: “the guy never paid. 
We sued him. 15 years later, we appealed against the decision. We realised that the guy 
disappeared, and that we won for glory. The judiciary is so complicated, so long that even when 
you manage to get a decision that’s worth something, you can’t have it enforced.” Legal 
enforcement also seems to have negative reputational effects: “You want to sue Casino [major 
French food retailer], and you win. Great. You’ve just lost the client. For good. Not only did you 
lose him, but you also probably exposed yourself to the others.” 
Bargaining power also impacts the outcome of a dispute. The smaller its bargaining 
power, the more the firm is likely to be held-up in a relationship it is not satisfied with, but 
locked into: for supplier-related problems, a firm is less likely to be satisfied if the supplier is a 
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monopolist, but as likely to resume trade. Contrary to the property rights rationale, vertical 
integration does not decrease enforcement problems; hypothesis 6 is confirmed. Having an 
ownership link with a supplier makes problems more likely to occur; the firm is more likely to do 
nothing, less likely to be satisfied, and as likely to resume trade. Among sample firms, 
integration concerns mostly bilateral monopolies that were linked together through public 
holding companies. Such a relationship is very prone to hold-up, but the holding company does 
not reduce enforcement problems. A sample firm had a monopoly on soda and beer production. 
It was linked to the monopolist on bottle production by SNI, and was facing numerous quality 
problems. SNI, however, was not playing any role in contract enforcement: “We were big 
enough to defend ourselves. We preferred to defend ourselves alone than to go through [SNI]. 
Nobody ever put his nose in our business.” 
Foreign firms and foreign trading firms constitute special cases of particular importance, 
as they allow the assessment of the roles of ethnicity and local institutions, respectively. When 
facing a dispute, foreign firms are less likely to do nothing, more likely to use the legal system, 
and less likely to be satisfied. This result is consistent with Bigsten et al., and suggests either that 
local firms have more lenient attitudes toward disputes, or are better at solving problems (see 
Section VI). 
Exporting firms are less likely to use the legal system than non-exporting firms for 
customer-related problems. For customer- and supplier-related problems respectively, exporting 
and importing firms are more likely to be satisfied than locally-trading firms. Interview data 
shows that this pattern is due to the fact that when dealing with foreign-based firms, problems 
are more excusable because they often involve external factors, such as transportation and 
customs: “we had late delivery problems due to suppliers, but it was rare. We mostly had 
transportation problems: ports issues, strikes issues …” Furthermore, transactions are protected 
by better-functioning institutions, such as letters of credit and insurances. Consequently, legal 
enforcement is used less often, and disputes are more satisfactorily resolved.  
Finally, customer- and supplier-related problems differ: for supplier-related problems, 
enforcement mechanisms are less used, and inaction is more frequent (Figure III). Private 
enforcement and the legal system are more likely to be used for customer-related problems, and 
the relationship is more likely to break up when it is customer-related (Table VII). Customer-
related problems are more acute than supplier-related problems. Firms hold large inventories to 
protect themselves against supplier-related problems (Table VIII). Customer-related problems 
have tax implications: “if you wanted to show a loss in your balance sheet, you had to have 
taken some legal action.” They also reduce the firm’s cash-flow: “you don’t always have money 
in your own till. So you use your bank. […] But the bank isn’t a milk-cow.” As customer-related 
problems are more acute, self-enforcement is supported by more drastic forms of enforcement 
(private and legalistic). Using these more drastic mechanisms makes the relationship more likely 
to break up.  
 
VI. Methods to avoid problems, social capital and private enforcement mechanisms 
Typically, contractual disputes can be avoided by carefully screening customers and 
suppliers, increasing inventory to cushion supplier-related problems, and refusing trade credit for 
customers. There is little evidence for the latter. However, most firms hold extra inventory, and 
look for information on their partner before dealing with him – 93% for customers, 72% for 
suppliers (Table VIII).  
The first source of information about trade partners is personal contact: “from dusk to 
dawn, you follow the customer, you look, you smell. If the customer is in trouble, you must 
know almost at the same time as him. We see the customer every week.” Acquaintances are the 
second source of information, followed by banks. This suggests that screening was more done 
through individual social capital than through formal sources, as the latter were quite unreliable: 
“at the time, we didn’t have other sources [of information] than customers’ reputation. We 
could ask for bank information, but it wasn’t certain that the information was reliable. There 
wasn’t a real risk agency that would gather all the info for all retailers and manufacturers. […] 
And it was said that [retailers] had three accounts: one for themselves, the real account; one for 
the bank; and one for the tax office.” 
To identify the relevant sources of social capital, respondents were asked how they found 
their main customer/supplier, and whom they asked to get information about their trade 
partners (Figures IV and V). Advertising’s small share confirms that markets are more face-to-
face than impersonal. The fact that “Other” is a major source for knowing customers/suppliers 
reflects the fact that it was “obvious”, or already there when the respondent joined the firm. 
This is consistent with small markets where agents are tied together through long-term 
relationships. Business associations’ small role is consistent with the fact that they were still 
nascent.73 
Business acquaintances are the first source of information about trade partners. A 
respondent describes the process: “I want to work with a new oil supplier. In my profession, I 
have two or three colleagues – even though they’re my competitors, we still have good relations 
                                                 
73 On business associations, see Catusse, Le Temps Des Entrepreneurs. Politique Et Transformations Du 
Capitalisme Au Maroc. 
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– I’ll go ask them what they think, they’ll tell me. I may enlarge a bit into other professions. 
Maybe through a Chamber of Commerce.” Business districts, such as Derb Omar or Rue de 
Strasbourg in Casablanca facilitated the formation of such informational networks. 
The second source of social capital is social connections and friends. Social connections 
and friends are relevant to business because small markets induce a close overlap between 
agents’ social and economic lives:  “[information on customers and suppliers] is told during 
dinners in Casablanca, it is said in sports clubs … Because people all meet. Casablanca isn’t 
big.” The network may have been constituted during early stages of socialisation: “I had my 
friends. My friends from university, my friends from high school … My network, I built it 
before.” 
Family and locality play a small role in deriving social capital. Only 15.6% of respondents 
ever had a trade partner from their extended family. Interview data shows that this is because 
family often works in other sectors. When family overlaps with business relations, it does not 
reduce enforcement costs: “family members, if they weren’t serious, if they didn’t have the 
necessary criteria to develop an activity, we preferred to stick to family relations.” Family 
capitalism, however, seems to be a foundation for trust, in a pattern similar to Ben-Porath: 
members of the family-firm develop a collective reputation that rolls over through generations.74 
A respondent mentioned pursuing trade credit on the same conditions with the heirs of client 
family-firms, precisely because he knew their fathers.  
Given the importance of Fassi family ties in the literature, another test is used to assess 
the importance of family as a source of social capital. Fassi respondents were asked to report 
their own surname, their mother’s and their spouse’s. Figure VI maps the network of Fassi 
respondents by activity sector. An edge connects two nodes if they have a surname in common. 
If family were an important source of social capital, we would expect a highly dense network, 
with more intra-sector edges than inter-sector edges. In fact, network density is low (.07), and 
only one tie in 10 is intra-sector.  
Connections with the state are an insignificant source of social capital. Only one 
respondent used political organisations to get information about his clients: “I had small 
payment problems [with Algerian semi-public companies]. I was there for the first commercial 
relation between Morocco and Algeria, and I interceded with the [Algerian] authorities, who 
eased payment.” Interview data on public markets is mixed: some respondents suggested that 
the procedure for calls was transparent, and that late payments were more a matter of self-
enforcement: “as long as the work has been done, public companies pay … on the condition 
                                                 
74 Ben-Porath, "The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange." 
that paperwork is standard, and that the case is followed properly.” Others suggested that calls 
were not transparent, and that political connections did reduce enforcement costs: “one who 
has connections, he sells well. One who doesn’t have connections, he doesn’t sell. And some 
calls were tailored for that someone. […] People that have connections, they’re paid. 
Immediately. People that were paid late were the ones who didn’t have connections.” 
Ethno-geographic groups are also an insignificant source of social capital. Only a few 
respondents acknowledged believing in ethno-geographic stereotypes: “For instance, Agadir 
people are serious. Marrakech people are average. Rabat people are serious. Each region has its 
qualities.” However, when those were probed about giving trade credit based on ethno-
geographic priors, they explained that they relied rather on a case-by-case basis: “no, we grant 
credit to people we know well, who are serious, who are important.” The only exception is the 
Jewish community who may have built a group reputation by setting-up a collective default 
mechanism: “I wasn’t worried at all by one clientele: the Moroccan Jewish customers. Because 
there was the community, and if a customer left without paying, the community would pay for 
him. There was solidarity.” This is consistent with what Geertz observed in Sefrou, where Jews 
were forming a hyperorganised community whom leading traders would stand over to conduct 
business.75 
Social capital is derived mostly from business acquaintances, and other social connections. 
Connections with the state, kin-based groups, and ethno-geographic groups play an almost 
insignificant role. Hypothesis 5 is rejected. Therefore, the fact that foreign firms are more likely 
to use the legal system, and less likely to be satisfied after a contractual dispute (see Section V) 
may reflect that they were less well-inserted in the general business community rather than that 
they did not pertain to some kin-based or ethno-geographic groups.  
Again, suppliers and customers show a different pattern: respondents look more for 
information about customers (Table VIII); secondary sources of social capital (social connections, 
friends, family, people from the same locality) are more important sources of information for 
customers (Figures IV and V). Indeed, the need to look for information on suppliers is less 
pressing because the firm is already protected by holding extra inventory. Furthermore, as we 
move up the supply chain, markets become increasingly concentrated, making business 
acquaintances good enough sources of information, and tempering the need to rely on 
secondary sources of information. As one respondent puts it: “the supplier is there, he is well-
established, and old. He is the one who needs to investigate on me.” 
                                                 
75 Geertz, "Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou." 
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The major role social capital plays in screening leads to a reconsideration of the role of 
private enforcement. Section V showed that private enforcement was the least used mechanism. 
Indeed, interview data shows that Dixit’s conditions for reputation-based mechanisms as 
efficient are not verified. 
Transmitting the news of deviation to all members is not accurate. “You can ask two 
suppliers, one will say ‘He’s a good client’, the other one ‘Be careful’.” First, people are reluctant 
to transmit the news of deviation for legal or moral reasons: “it’s forbidden by law. You can get 
sued for that”; “managing a company is not about tattling.” Second, the news of deviation is 
inaccurate because informants may have had different experiences: “I’m a bad payer, I come to 
you and give you a 10000DH cheque. You cash it. I know you’re a friend of that guy nearby. I 
go see him. He asks you for your opinion, you say he’s good. I give him a 10000DH cheque, it 
returns unpaid.” Third, people may free-ride by withholding information: “I try to get 
information from the public, but I don’t give any.” Finally, for customer-related problems, 
transmitting the news of deviation may be counterproductive when locked in a relationship: “if 
you undermine his reputation, it means you’re penalising his sales, so he has less chances to 
repay you.”  
Inflicting punishment is not accurate either, mostly because unverifiable information limits 
the scope for third-parties’ intervention. Interview data shows no evidence for participating to a 
collective punishment. For the same reason, informants seldom become informal arbiters: “I 
seldom ask [the informant] ‘Can you intercede with him for me?’ because he needs to have all 
the elements.”  
However, all respondents declared paying great attention to reputation; to their own: 
“your value is your reputation, not your bank account”, and their trade partners’: “suppose you 
want to work with a new supplier. The first thing you do is to listen what people say about him. 
A customer told me once: ‘A supplier whom everyone says is good can’t be bad’.”  
In fact, reputation works as a passive mechanism that disseminates information locally. 
Seemingly, information flows by itself. Respondents often referred to reputation as “rumour”, 
or “white noise”. They seem not to participate to the flow of information: “[reputation] is 
undermined by itself. I don’t have to undermine it personally. Me, I don’t say anything. But it will 
be known. A bad payer, it’s well-known.” How does information flow? 
The information the network carries is imperfect. It is transmitted only locally, and on 
demand: “if the client doesn’t pay, we won’t spread it around ‘Careful, this one didn’t pay me’. 
Except if one asks me.” Information-transmission is reciprocal: “when I ask a friend, he tells me. 
If he asks me about a customer that caused me trouble, I’ll tell him too.” The transmitted 
information concerns only major problems: “if it’s someone who really screwed up, of course 
[we tell]. But a delay … we may as well wait for a month of two. We don’t make a fuss”. Cross-
referencing overcomes imperfect information, and turns rumour into useful information: 
“there’s no guarantee to what people say. It’s just small pieces of information you can put one 
next to another, and investigate yourself. […] Rumour is key, but must be checked out”. Finally, 
a small market size facilitates information circulation: “the world today is a village. A bad 
customer or a bad supplier, it’s immediately known on the market”. Consequently, market 
events are easy to follow, without even having to circulate information actively: “if you have an 
enamel supplier called FERRAUD, and you break up with FERRAUD, all tile producers in Morocco 
know, and they wonder why”. 
Reputation’s effect on contract enforcement is twofold: ex-ante, screening of customers 
and suppliers; ex-post, increased leniency and flexibility in the event of a dispute: “when you go 
through a hard blow, you have echo. People say ‘Mr Harouchi has always been honest. Today, 
he has a problem, we must help him’. Either easing the terms of payment or giving a discount”. 
Reputation is not, however, an enforcement mechanism like self-enforcement or legal 
enforcement: “I don’t make it a means of pressure to tell him ‘If you don’t pay, I’ll tell everyone’. 
No, ‘If you don’t pay, I’ll take legal action. If you don’t pay, I’ll withdraw the material’”.  
Informal arbitration deserves special attention. As seen earlier, it is seldom used because 
of unverifiable information. When it is used, the private arbiter must have some sort of 
connection to both parties, which severely restricts its scope: “I rely to arbitration if the person I 
see has a strong link to the other company’s manager, either friendship or family. But it’s rare”. 
Furthermore, rather than being an impartial private judge enforcing a norm, the arbiter is more 
a middle-man that transmits take-it-or-leave-it offers between parties: “the arbiter is a guy that 
comes to see you […] and says: ‘I’ll handle this. What are you ready to give, what aren’t you 
ready to give’ etc.” 
As a result, reputation is more tied to information circulation and screening than to 
enforcement. It is a consequence of individual social capital, in the sense that the wider one’s 
network of relationships, the more accurate the information it can collect, rather than a 
consequence of collective social capital, as reputation does not facilitate any sort of collective 
punishment. This has three implications. First, efficiency of private enforcement needs to be 
reconsidered. Following Uzzi’s insight,76 at the network level, efficiency of information 
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circulation depends on the structure of the business network. Because of the reciprocal and on-
demand nature of information, the more embedded the network, the smoother information-
circulation. At the firm level, efficiency of screening depends on the individual social capital that 
the two parties hold, and therefore on their position within this structure. Indeed, since social 
capital is derived mostly from the business network itself, a party that is connected to many 
network nodes should derive more social capital (increased capacity of access to on-demand 
information, increased capacity of cross-referencing imprecise information). Second, quantitative 
tests could not find any evidence of reputation mechanisms precisely because they were 
considering it as an enforcement mechanism. Third, given this reconsidering of private 
enforcement, the extent to which it affected contract enforcement cannot be assessed with 
certainty. Hypothesis 4 cannot be accepted nor rejected.  
 
VII. Dynamics 
The institutional environment deteriorated after SAP. Section V showed that the new 
generation of entrepreneurs was more likely to experience problems. Respondents confirmed 
this pattern: “there is no doubt that payment delays of private agents got considerably longer … 
in both senses: people tend to pay their suppliers with more delay, and with more difficulty. […] 
If you ask me for a date, I’d say 1980”; “by 1980-85, we started to have problems with 
customers. […] We were forced to go to court, for payment”. 
One hypothesis was that entrepreneurs’ moral standard were high, then deteriorated 
after the period, while management practices became more formalised. Deteriorating morality 
would increase contractual disputes. Table IX shows that business executives had indeed the 
highest moral standards during the period, as they have the highest proportion of “High” and 
“Average”.77 Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. However, at best, business executives’ moral standards 
did not deteriorate after the period (Table X). Furthermore, there is no significant difference in 
the use of contracts nor of legal enforcement between the new and the old generation (Table 
VII). Hypothesis 3 is rejected.  
The institutional environment deteriorated due to a less embedded business network and 
more competitive market structures, rather than to the deterioration of generalised morality. 
Trade liberalisation opened up to agents the possibility to import, and easier access to capital 
encouraged agents to start new businesses. Consequently, market structures became more 
competitive, which equalised agent’s bargaining power, with implications for self-enforcement. 
On the one hand, former monopolists saw their bargaining power decrease as liberalisation 
increased their customers’ outside options, resulting in increasing customer-related contractual 
                                                 
77 Judges and MPs have high non-response rates because respondents often felt uncomfortable answering 
these questions, and because the Parliament was suspended repeatedly during the period. 
disputes. A respondent used to manage the only cold-storage warehouse in Fes. After 1980, 
competing warehouses were founded, and he saw payment problems increase as his customers 
now had the possibility to go to competing warehouses. On the other hand, customers of these 
monopolies saw their bargaining power increase, which reduced supplier-related contractual 
disputes: “in 1984, import licences are deleted. Tariffs are still high, but it is possible to import, 
and the relationship with this monopolistic supplier begins to change. [It] forced this supplier to 
make efforts of quality upgrades and price reduction, and it’s much better than in the past”. As 
a first approximation, we can conclude that equalisation of bargaining power had, overall, a null 
effect on self-enforcement, as decreasing supplier-related disputes were compensated by 
increasing customer-related disputes.  
The preceding section showed that the business network was very embedded. 
Respondents suggested that entry of new entrepreneurs decreased embeddedness by breaking 
the social ties that were overlapping with business, which disrupted private enforcement 
mechanisms: “there were few market actors [before SAP]. We used to know better, personally, 
the actors, and so more important personal relations used to develop”; “[before], people used 
to know each other; we used to know what was going on. Cheaters were known. Today, we 
don’t have that possibility anymore. Because we live in big cities of 5, 6 million inhabitants like 
Casablanca. So it’s more difficult to know what’s going on.” 
An increasing number of players decreased the efficiency of private enforcement, which 
corresponds to Li’s dynamic.78 However, the judicial system’s quality did not increase, leaving the 
efficiency of legal enforcement unchanged. Efficiency of self-enforcement did not change either. 
Therefore, overall, efficiency of enforcement mechanisms decreased, and contractual disputes 
became more frequent. Furthermore, adoption of new management (just-in-time …) in order to 
cut costs put agents at more risk, as they had to reduce the inventory they formerly held to 
protect themselves against supplier-related problems.  
Conclusion 
During the ISI, state-capitalist period, Moroccan manufacturers were operating in an 
environment characterised by high risk of contractual breach, and by long-term, face-to-face 
relationships with a small number of customers and suppliers. To enforce contracts, they were 
relying primarily on direct negotiation with customers or suppliers. Legal enforcement played a 
minor role, because it would lead to break up a valuable relationship, and because a 
dysfunctional judicial system would not necessarily lead to a satisfactory outcome.  
                                                 
78 Li, "Relation-Based Versus Rule-Based Governance: An Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian 
Crisis." See Section I.  
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To avoid contractual problems, entrepreneurs were largely relying on their acquaintances: 
economic life was largely embedded in social life. However, social capital was derived from the 
business network and social connections rather than from connections with the state, kin-based 
and ethno-geographic groups. Therefore, the fact that foreign firms were more likely to use the 
legal system, and less likely to be satisfied after a contractual dispute may reflect more that they 
were less well-inserted in the business community than that they did not pertain to some kin-
based or ethno-geographic groups. 
The Maghribi industrialists qualify the Maghribi traders: interview data shows that private 
enforcement is a way of screening customers and suppliers based on on-demand, reciprocal 
exchange of imprecise information, rather than a way of inflicting collective punishment. This 
implies that the efficiency of private enforcement depends, from a collective point of view, on 
the structure of the business network; from an individual point of view, on the individual social 
capital that agents hold within this structure. The existing quantitative literature on contract 
enforcement could not find any evidence on private enforcement because it considered it as an 
enforcement mechanism rather than as an information-circulation and screening mechanism. 
Because of this reconsidering of private enforcement, the extent to which it was affecting 
contract enforcement cannot be assessed with certainty. Further research is needed to precise 
the impact of the business network’s structure on private enforcement.  
Finally, the institutional environment deteriorated after SAP and the dismantling of state-
capitalism. However, it seems that this deterioration was not due to a decline of generalised 
morality, but to the fact that the business network became less embedded, as an increased 
number of players disrupted its structure and decreased the efficiency of private enforcement. 
As the efficiency of legal enforcement did not increase, the efficiency of enforcement 




Sectors: use of SIC 1982, recoded as follows:  
- Food processing: sector 10 (Produits des industries alimentaires), sector 11 (Autres produits des industries 
alimentaires), sector 12 (Boissons et Tabacs). 
- Textile: sector 13 (Produits textiles et bonneteries), sector 14 (Habillement (à l'exclusion des chaussures)), 
sector 15 (Cuirs, dérivés du cuir et articles en cuir). 
- Light industry: sector 16 (Bois et articles en bois), sector 17 (Papier, Carton et imprimerie), sector 21 
(Construction de machines et matériels d'équipement (non compris les matériels de transport)), sector 22 
(Matériels de transport), sector 23 (Matériels électriques et électroniques), sector 24 (Machines de bureau, 
instruments de précision, de mesure, et de contrôle optique et horlogerie), sector 26 (Articles en 
caoutchouc ou en plastique), sector 27 (Produits des autres industries manufacturières). 
- Heavy industry: sector 18 (Produits issus de la transformation des minéraux de carrière), sector 19 
(Produits de l'industrie métallique), sector 20 (Ouvrages en métaux (non compris les machines et matériels 
de transport)), sector 25 (Produits de la chimie et de la parachimie). 
Regions: use of 1982 administrative division: 
- Sud 
- Tensift 





Length of relationship with clients and suppliers: discrete categories recoded as follows: 
- Less than 1 year: 0.5 
- 1 to 3 years: 2 
- 3 to 5 years: 4 
- 5 to 10 years: 7.5 
- More than 10 years: 12.5. Given the average age of the firm in 1982 (35 years), this seems to be a 
conservative upper bound. Length of relationship is higher than Bigsten et al. (2000: 10) for upper bound 
= 10 with client, for upper bound = 11.2 with suppliers.  
Cohorts: respondent classified as belonging to the old cohort if his birth year is strictly inferior to the 
median birth year (1941). Classified as belonging to the young cohort otherwise.  
Categories of mechanisms:  
- Do nothing: if has responded “wait, do very little”. 
- Other categories: if has responded “yes” to at least one mechanism of the category. Shadow of law has 
been merged with legal enforcement.  
For tests: 
- Exporting firm: if share of exported output strictly higher than mean (23%) 
- Importing firm: if share of imported input strictly higher than mean (42%) 




SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 











Food processing (Pilot study) 1917 n/a 450 European Christian Sales manager Casablanca, Citycenter 1h10min 23/12/10 
Food processing 1957 n/a 45 Arab Muslim Managing director Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 40min 30/03/11 
Food processing 1944 1985 30 European Christian Sales manager Safi 55min 12/04/11 
Food processing 1923 n/a 50 Arab Muslim Chairman Fes 1h15min 13/04/11 
Food processing 1946 1984 115 Berber Muslim Chairman Safi 45min 13/04/11 
Food processing 1947 n/a 20 Arab Muslim Director Safi 45min 15/04/11 
Food processing 1955 n/a 400 Arab Muslim Sales manager Casablanca, Roches Noires 30min 18/04/11 
Food processing 1947 n/a 150 Arab Muslim Chairman and CEO Agadir 35min 22/04/11 
Heavy industry  (Pilot study) . 2010 10 Arab Muslim CEO Casablanca, Maarif 45min 22/12/10 
Heavy industry  (Pilot study) 1947 2002 150 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Citycenter 1h 23/12/10 
Heavy industry  (Pilot study) 1964 n/a 65 European Christian CEO Safi 45min 27/12/10 
Heavy industry 1923 n/a 500 Muslim Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 40min 28/03/11 
Heavy industry 1948 2001 60 Arab Muslim CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 45min 28/03/11 
Heavy industry 1976 n/a 950 Arab Muslim Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Sidi Maarouf 45min 29/03/11 
Heavy industry 1959 n/a 50 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 55min 31/03/11 
Heavy industry . n/a 53 Arab Muslim Chairman Casablanca 1hmin 06/04/11 
Light industry  (Pilot study) . 1987 200 European Christian CEO Mohammedia 1h05min 13/12/10 
Light industry  (Pilot study) 1966 1986 35 Arab Muslim Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 1h 28/12/10 
Light industry 1948 n/a 450 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Mers Sultan 50min 01/04/11 
Light industry 1920 n/a 700 Berber Muslim CEO Casablanca, Liberté 45min 04/04/11 
Light industry 1950 1988 300 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 1h 05/04/11 
Light industry 1966 n/a 15 Arab Muslim CEO Rabat, Quartier Hassan 1h15min 07/04/11 
Light industry 1927 1980 300 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Route Mediouna 1h15min 08/04/11 
Light industry 1967 n/a 325 Arab Muslim Chief accountant Fes, Quartier industriel 55min 13/04/11 
Light industry 1930 n/a 15 European Christian CEO Casablanca, Citycenter 55min 14/04/11 
Light industry 1937 n/a 500 European Christian Managing director Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 50min 15/04/11 
Light industry 1952 2000 200 Arab Muslim CEO Casablanca, Maarif 35min 25/04/11 
Textile 1946 n/a 23 European Jewish Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Maarif 1h 15/03/11 
Textile 1955 1978 150 Arab Muslim CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 40min 30/03/11 
Textile 1976 1985 120 Arab Muslim Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 45min 04/04/11 
Textile 1918 n/a 300 Muslim CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 40min 05/04/11 
Textile 1950 1991 700 Arab Muslim Chairman and CEO Casablanca, Ain Sebaa 55min 09/04/11 


















    
Private enforcement 0.12 1 
   
Shadow of law 0.11 0.28*** 1   
Legalistic enforcement 0.10 0.26*** 0.83*** 1  
No action taken -0.12 0.09 -0.17* -0.24** 1 
Note. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Informations biographiques 
1. En quelle année êtes-vous né ? Où ? : 
_______________ 





 Autre (préciser ____________________) 




 Autre (préciser ____________________) 
4. Où est né votre père ?  _________________ 
5. Quelle était sa profession ? ______________________ 
6. Où avez-vous fait vos études supérieures ? 
____________ 
7. Lesquels de ces diplômes avez-vous ? 
 Baccalauréat 
 Licence (ou équivalent Bac+3) 
 Master (ou équivalent Bac+5) 
 Doctorat 
8. En quelle année êtes-vous entré en fonction dans 
l'entreprise ? ___________ 
9. Quelle était votre position dans l'entreprise ? (titre 
officiel. Si évolution, prière de mentionner). 
____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
10. En quelle année avez-vous quitté l'entreprise ? 
__________ 
Informations sur l'entreprise 
11. Comment s'appelait l'entreprise ?  
_____________________________________ 
12. En quelle année a-t-elle été fondée ? _______ 
13. Où étaient situés les bâtiments principaux ? (ville, 
quartier) : _______________________ 
14. Quel était son secteur d'activité ? __________ 
_____________________________________ 
15. En quelle année a-t-elle été rachetée ou a-t-elle 
fermée ? (si non pertinent, laisser vide) _________ 
16. Combien y avait-t-il d'employés à temps-plein ? 
________ 
17. Quel était le chiffre d'affaires annuel ?  
_____________________ 
18. Y-avait-il du capital étranger ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
19. Y-avait-il du capital public ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
20. Quel était le groupe ethnique du manager ? 





 Autre (préciser ____________________) 
21. Quelle était la religion du manager ? (plusieurs choix 




 Autre (préciser ____________________) 
Informations clients 
22. Quel a été le nombre minimum de clients réguliers ? 
______ 
23. Quel a été le nombre maximum de clients 
réguliers ? ______ 
24. Avec vos clients réguliers seulement,  combien de 
temps duraient vos relations commerciales 
typiquement ? 
 Moins d'un an 
 Entre 1 et 3 ans 
 Entre 3 et 5 ans 
 Entre 5 et 10 ans 
 Plus de 10 ans 
25. Avez-vous vendu au consommateur final ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
26. Avez-vous vendu à des entreprises publiques ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
27. L'entreprise ou certains de ses actionnaires 
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possédait-ils du capital de certain de vos clients ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
28. Pendant une année typique, quelle part de votre 
production était exportée ? ______ % 
Informations fournisseurs 
29. Quel a été le nombre minimum de fournisseurs 
réguliers ? ______ 
30. Quel a été le nombre maximum de fournisseurs 
réguliers ? ______ 
31. Avec vos fournisseurs réguliers seulement,  combien 
de temps duraient vos relations commerciales 
typiquement ? 
 Moins d'un an 
 Entre 1 et 3 ans 
 Entre 3 et 5 ans 
 Entre 5 et 10 ans 
 Plus de 10 ans 








34. L'entreprise ou certain de ses actionnaires possédait-
ils du capital de certain de vos fournisseurs ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
35. Pendant une année typique, quelle part de votre 
matière première était importée ? ______% 
Partie 2 
- Quelle a été votre occupation jusqu'à votre 
prise de fonction dans l'entreprise ? 
- Comment a évolué l'activité de l'entreprise de 
votre entrée en fonction au plan d'ajustement 
structurel ? 
- Quelle était la clientèle de votre entreprise ? 
- Avec vos clients, avez-vous eu des problèmes de 
retard de paiement ou de non-paiement ? 
- Comment essayiez-vous de régler ces 
problèmes ? 
- Comment essayiez-vous de prévenir ces 
problèmes ? 
- Qu'advenait-il de la relation avec le client après 
un de ces problèmes ? 
- Qui étaient les fournisseurs de votre 
entreprise ? 
- Avec vos fournisseurs, avez-vous eu des 
problèmes de retard de livraison, de non-livraison ou de 
qualité  ? 
- Comment essayiez-vous de régler ces 
problèmes ? 
- Comment essayiez-vous de prévenir ces 
problèmes ? 
- Qu'advenait-il de la relation avec le fournisseur 
après un de ces problèmes ? 
- Vos relations avec vos clients ou vos 
fournisseurs ont-elles changé après l'indépendance ? 
- Vos relations avec vos clients ou vos 
fournisseurs ont-elles changé après la marocanisation ? 
- Vos relations avec vos clients ou vos 
fournisseurs ont-elles changé après le plan d'ajustement 
structurel ? 
- En économie, on considère que la confiance 
prévient les problèmes avec les clients et les fournisseurs 
parce que dévier de ses engagements brise la confiance 
dans la relation commerciale. Comment définiriez-vous 
la confiance ? Celle-ci jouait-elle un rôle dans vos 
relations avec vos clients et vos fournisseurs ?  
- En économie, on considère que la loi prévient 
les problèmes avec les clients et les fournisseurs parce 
que dévier de ses engagements est puni par la loi.  
Aviez-vous recours à la loi dans vos relations avec vos 
clients et vos fournisseurs ? 
- En économie, on considère que les réseaux 
sociaux qui entourent les affaires protègent des 
problèmes commerciaux parce qu'ils attribuent une 
réputation à chacun. La réputation jouait elle un rôle 
dans vos relations avec vos clients et vos fournisseurs ? 
- Au Maroc, on attache beaucoup d’importance 
à la famille. Les relations familiales (au sens large) 
jouaient-elles un rôle dans vos relations avec vos clients 
ou vos fournisseurs ? 
- Au Maroc, les Shleuh ont la réputation d'être 
honnêtes. Etiez-vous plus rassuré si votre client ou votre 
fournisseur était d'une certaine origine ?
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Relations avec les clients 
36. Comment avez-vous connu votre principal client ? 
(plusieurs choix possibles ; laisser vide si celui-ci était 
déjà client à votre entrée en fonction, ou s’il était 
« évident ») 
 A travers une  association professionnelle 
 A travers la publicité, des brochures d'information 
 A travers d'autres relations d'affaires 
 Il était de la même localité 
 C'était un ami 
 C'était un membre de la famille étendue 
 A travers vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 A travers des organisations politiques 
37. Avec vos clients, aviez-vous un document écrit ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
38. Avec vos clients, aviez-vous un contrat exécutable 
devant un tribunal ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
39. Essayiez-vous de recueillir des informations sur vos 
clients ? (Si non, passer à la question 42.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
40. Pour recueillir ces informations, aviez-vous recours ? 
(plusieurs choix possibles) 
 A un contact personnel (visites à son entreprise …). 
 Au système bancaire 
 A vos connaissances 
41. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « A vos connaissances » à la question précédente) 
Vos connaissances, qui en particulier ? 
 Membres d'une  association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 




43. Avez-vous eu des problèmes de retard de 
paiement ? (si non, passer à la question 51.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
44. A quelle fréquence ? 
 1 = Très peu fréquent 
 2 = Peu fréquent 
 3 = Moyen 
 4 = Fréquent 
 5 = Très fréquent 
45. Après un retard de paiement, que faisiez-vous pour 
accélérer le paiement ? (plusieurs choix possibles) 
 Insister pour que l'engagement soit respecté 
(réclamations, rappels …) 
 Négocier le paiement (montant, échelons) 
 Menacer de refuser les commandes futures 
 Endommager la réputation du client 
  Avoir recours à un arbitre 
 Avoir recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami 
 Menacer de prendre des mesures juridiques 
 Faire appel à un avocat pour résoudre le conflit 
 Aller au tribunal 
 Trouver un nouveau client 
 Attendre, faire presque rien. 
46. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « endommager la réputation du client » à la 
question précédente) Auprès de qui en particulier 
endommagiez-vous la réputation du client ? 
 Membres d'une association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
47. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « Avoir recours à un arbitre » ou la case « Avoir 
recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami » à la question 
45.) Qui était cet arbitre, cet intermédiaire ou cet ami ? 
 Membre d'une association professionnelle 
 Autre relation d'affaires 
 Personne de la même localité 
 Ami 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Une relation sociale ou religieuse 
 Un membre d'une organisation politique 
48. Typiquement, après un retard de paiement, le 
problème était-il résolu ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
49. Typiquement, étiez-vous satisfait du résultat ? 
 Oui 
 Non 




51. Avez-vous eu des problèmes de non-paiement ? (si 
non, passer à la question 59.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
52. A quelle fréquence ? 
 1 = Très peu fréquent 
 2 = Peu fréquent 
 3 = Moyen 
 4 = Fréquent 
 5 = Très fréquent 
53. Après un non-paiement, que faisiez-vous pour 
accélérer le paiement ? (plusieurs choix possibles) 
 Insister pour que l'engagement soit respecté 
(réclamations, rappels …) 
 Négocier le paiement (montant, échelons) 
 Menacer de refuser les commandes futures 
 Endommager la réputation du client 
  Avoir recours à un arbitre 
 Avoir recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami 
 Menacer de prendre des mesures juridiques 
 Faire appel à un avocat pour résoudre le conflit 
 Aller au tribunal 
 Trouver un nouveau client 
 Attendre, faire presque rien. 
54. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « endommager la réputation du client » à la 
question précédente) Auprès de qui en particulier 
endommagiez-vous la réputation du client ? 
 Membres d'une association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
55. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « Avoir recours à un arbitre » ou la case « Avoir 
recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami » à la question 
53.) Qui était cet arbitre, cet intermédiaire ou cet ami ? 
 Membre d'une association professionnelle 
 Autre relation d'affaires 
 Personne de la même localité 
 Ami 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Une relation sociale ou religieuse 
 Un membre d'une organisation politique 
56. Typiquement, après un non-paiement, le 
contentieux était-il résolu ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
57. Typiquement, étiez-vous satisfait du résultat ? 
 Oui 
 Non 





Relations avec les fournisseurs 
59. Comment avez-vous connu votre principal 
fournisseur ? (plusieurs choix possibles ; laisser vide si 
celui-ci était déjà fournisseur à votre entrée en fonction, 
ou s’il était « évident ») 
 A travers une  association professionnelle 
 A travers la publicité, des brochures d'information 
 A travers d'autres relations d'affaires 
 Il était de la même localité 
 C'était un ami 
 C'était un membre de la famille étendue 
 A travers vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 A travers des organisations politiques 




61. Avec vos fournisseurs, aviez-vous un contrat 
exécutable devant un tribunal ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
62. Avec vos fournisseurs, faisiez-vous attention à avoir 
du stock ? 
 Oui 
 Non 




64. Pour recueillir ces informations, aviez-vous recours ? 
(plusieurs choix possibles) 
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 A un contact personnel (visites à son entreprise …). 
 Au système bancaire 
 A vos connaissances 
65. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « A vos connaissances » à la question précédente) 
Vos connaissances, qui en particulier ? 
 Membres d'une  association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
66. Avez-vous eu des problèmes de retard de livraison ? 
(si non, passer à la question 74.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
67. A quelle fréquence ? 
 1 = Très peu fréquent 
 2 = Peu fréquent 
 3 = Moyen 
 4 = Fréquent 
 5 = Très fréquent 
68. Après un retard de livraison, que faisiez-vous pour 
accélérer la livraison ? (plusieurs choix possibles) 
 Insister pour que l'engagement soit respecté 
(réclamations, rappels …) 
 Négocier les termes de l'arrangement 
 Refuser de payer 
 Demander un remboursement 
 Endommager la réputation du fournisseur 
  Avoir recours à un arbitre 
 Avoir recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami 
 Menacer de prendre des mesures juridiques 
 Faire appel à un avocat pour résoudre le conflit 
 Aller au tribunal 
 Trouver un nouveau fournisseur 
 Attendre, faire presque rien. 
69. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « endommager la réputation du client » à la 
question précédente) Auprès de qui en particulier 
endommagiez-vous la réputation du client ? 
 Membres d'une association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
70. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « Avoir recours à un arbitre » ou la case « Avoir 
recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami » à la question 
68.) Qui était cet arbitre, cet intermédiaire ou cet ami ? 
 Membre d'une association professionnelle 
 Autre relation d'affaires 
 Personne de la même localité 
 Ami 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Une relation sociale ou religieuse 
 Un membre d'une organisation politique 
71. Typiquement, après un retard de livraison, le 
contentieux était-il résolu ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
72. Typiquement, étiez-vous satisfait du résultat ? 
 Oui 
 Non 




74. Avez-vous eu des problèmes de non-livraison? (si 
non, passer à la question 82.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
75. A quelle fréquence ? 
 1 = Très peu fréquent 
 2 = Peu fréquent 
 3 = Moyen 
 4 = Fréquent 
 5 = Très fréquent 
76. Après une non-livraison, que faisiez-vous pour 
accélérer la livraison ? (plusieurs choix possibles) 
 Insister pour que l'engagement soit respecté 
(réclamations, rappels …) 
 Négocier les termes de l'arrangement 
 Refuser de payer 
 Demander un remboursement 
 Endommager la réputation du fournisseur 
  Avoir recours à un arbitre 
 Avoir recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami 
 Menacer de prendre des mesures juridiques 
 Faire appel à un avocat pour résoudre le conflit 
 Aller au tribunal 
 Trouver un nouveau fournisseur 
 Attendre, faire presque rien. 
77. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « endommager la réputation du client » à la 
question précédente) Auprès de qui en particulier 
endommagiez-vous la réputation du client ? 
 Membres d'une association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
78. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « Avoir recours à un arbitre » ou la case « Avoir 
recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami » à la question 
76.) Qui était cet arbitre, cet intermédiaire ou cet ami? 
 Membre d'une association professionnelle 
 Autre relation d'affaires 
 Personne de la même localité 
 Ami 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Une relation sociale ou religieuse 
 Un membre d'une organisation politique 
79. Typiquement, après une non-livraison, le 
contentieux était-il résolu ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
80. Typiquement, étiez-vous satisfait du résultat ? 
 Oui 
 Non 




82. Avez-vous eu des problèmes de qualité ? (si non, 
passer à la question 90.) 
 Oui 
 Non 
83. A quelle fréquence ? 
 1 = Très peu fréquent 
 2 = Peu fréquent 
 3 = Moyen 
 4 = Fréquent 
 5 = Très fréquent 
84. Après un problème de qualité, que faisiez-vous pour 
régler le problème ? (plusieurs choix possibles) 
 Insister pour que l'engagement soit respecté 
(réclamations, rappels …) 
 Négocier les termes de l'arrangement 
 Refuser de payer 
 Demander un remboursement 
 Endommager la réputation du fournisseur 
 Avoir recours à un arbitre 
 Avoir recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami 
 Menacer de prendre des mesures juridiques 
 Faire appel à un avocat pour résoudre le conflit 
 Aller au tribunal 
 Trouver un nouveau fournisseur 
 Attendre, faire presque rien. 
85. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « endommager la réputation du client » à la 
question précédente) Auprès de qui en particulier 
endommagiez-vous la réputation du client ? 
 Membres d'une association professionnelle 
 Autres relations d'affaires 
 Personnes de la même localité 
 Amis 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Vos relations sociales ou religieuses 
 Des membres d'organisations politiques 
86. (Répondre à cette question si vous avez coché la 
case « Avoir recours à un arbitre » ou la case « Avoir 
recours à un intermédiaire ou un ami » à la question 
84.) Qui était cet arbitre, cet intermédiaire ou cet ami? 
 Membre d'une association professionnelle 
 Autre relation d'affaires 
 Personne de la même localité 
 Ami 
 Membre de la famille étendue 
 Une relation sociale ou religieuse 
 Un membre d'une organisation politique 
87. Typiquement, après un problème de qualité, le 
contentieux était-il résolu ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
88. Typiquement, étiez-vous satisfait du résultat ? 
 Oui 
 Non 





90. L'un de vos clients ou de vos fournisseurs était-il de 









92. Les questions suivantes comparent différentes 
organisations. Comment qualifieriez-vous l'éthique et 
















96. Selon vous, comparé à avant le plan d’ajustement 
structurel ; aujourd’hui, un contrat est : 
 Plus facilement exécutable devant un tribunal 
 Moins facilement exécutable devant un tribunal 
 Pareil 
97. Selon vous, comparé à avant le plan d'ajustement 
structurel ; aujourd’hui, l'éthique des affaires : 
 S'est améliorée 
















    
Food processing 24.7% 20.1% 24.2% 14.9% 
Textile  28.2% 35.6% 18.2% 27.2% 
Heavy industry (metal works, 
chemicals) 
21.4% 23.0% 24.2% 21.8% 
Light industry 25.8% 21.2% 33.3% 36.1% 
Locations 
    
Centre (Casablanca region) 57.7% 62.2% 75.8% 90.9% 
Other 42.3% 37.8% 24.2% 9.1% 
Size 
    
0-9 employees 28.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
10-49 43.6% 15.6% 24.2% 2.3% 
50-99 13.4% 15.7% 15.2% 3.3% 
100-199 8.0% 16.8% 15.2% 8.1% 
200-499 5.1% 23.7% 27.3% 34.7% 
500+ 1.9% 25.4% 18.2% 51.6% 
Average number of employees 65 255 
Source. Direction de l’industrie (1982a, 1982b) 
Note. Census data are averages of 1978 and 1980. Refer to Appendix to see how 






















Before Moroccanization1 18.8% 81.2% 
After Moroccanization1 63.7% 36.3% 
Average before-after1 41.2% 58.8% 
Sample2 50.0% 50.0% 
 
Private capital State capital 
19651 21.8% 78.2% 
19751 27.6% 72.4% 
Average 1965-751 24.7% 75.3% 
Sample2 90.6% 9.4% 
Source. Berrada (1988: 68) for nationality; El Malki (1982: 
175 for public-private) 
1 Percentages based on aggregate quantities of capital. 













SAMPLE STRUCTURE, RESPONDENTS 
 
Sample Moroccans Europeans 
Ethnicity1 
   
Arabs 54.8% 
  
Among which: Fassis2 48.4% 
  










No bac 18.2% 26.3% 8.3% 
Bac 9.1% 10.5% 0.0% 
Bac+3 (or equivalent) 18.2% 21.1% 16.7% 
Bac+5 (or equivalent) 54.5% 42.1% 75.0% 
Average years of higher 
education3 
4.0 3.7 4.6 
N 33 19 12 
1 Respondents’ ethnicity does not significantly differ from managers’ 
ethnicity. 
2 A Fassi is an Arab who was born in Fes or whose father was born in 
Fes. 
























Birth year (average) 1932 1947 t-test -8.22*** 
Entry year in the firm (average) 1964 1972 t-test -2.71** 
Exit year (average) 1997 1997 t-test -0.05 
Education  
   
No bac 33.3% 5.6% 
  
Bac 0.0% 16.7% 
  
Bac+3 (or equivalent) 20.0% 16.7% 
  
Bac+5 (or equivalent) 46.7% 61.1% 
 
0.11 
N 15 18 exact 0.09*  


















Loyalty of clients  Loyalty to suppliers  
N. clients (median) 50 N. suppliers 16 
length of relationship1 (years) 10.1 length of relationship1 10.4 
Type of client  Market power  
sells to end-users 72.7% one supplier monopolistic 42.4% 
sells to public firms 66.7% one supplier public firm 21.9% 
share of exported output 23.3% share of imported inputs 42.1% 
Formalism  Formalism  
written document 93.9% written document 93.9% 
written contract 42.4% written contract 55.2% 
Note. percentages refer to the proportion of responding firms in the category. 






CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES WITH CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS 
 
With customers With suppliers  
 
Late payment Non-payment Late delivery Non-delivery Deficient quality 
Incidence of disputes      
respondents citing problems 90.9% 60.6% 71.9% 25.0% 68.8% 
frequency (1 to 5 scale)  2.11 1.35 1.96 1.13 1.59 
Outcome of disputes      
dispute settled1 96.3% 82.4% 95.2% 85.7% 95.0% 
satisfied with outcome1 72.0% 50.0% 76.2% 57.1% 78.9% 
continue to trade1 80.8% 27.8% 95.0% 57.1% 94.4% 
Note. Percentages refer to the proportion of responding firms in the category. Otherwise, the mean response is 
reported. 
1 Conditional on a dispute having occurred 
TABLE VII 
PATTERNS OF CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, MAIN RESULTS 
Variable Mean (%) Variable Test 
Summary 
stat. 
Variable Mean (%) Variable Test 
Summary 
stat. 
Variable Mean (%) Variable Test 
Summary 
stat. 
Occurrence of a dispute  Shadow of law and/or legal enforcement Satisfied with outcome 












Failed firm chi-2 3.10* 













































































































Having a written contract Non-exporting firm, 













Foreign capital chi-2 5.03** 








Private enforcement Non-exporting firm, 




















Failed firm chi-2 8.24*** 
Non-importing firm, 





































































       


















       
                        
Note. This table reads as follows: for the first line, first column, a dispute occurred in 52.8% cases out of 72 potential disputes for the old generation; it occurred in 72.2% cases out of 90 potential 
disputes for the new generation. A chi-2 test shows that the frequency distribution is significantly different at the 1% level. 
The elementary unit of analysis is the contractual dispute. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Percentages refer to the 
proportion of responding firms in the 
category. 









PERCEPTIONS OF HONESTY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN 









High 12.0% 34.6% 18.2% 9.1% 
Average 60.0% 57.7% 36.4% 36.4% 
Low 28.0% 7.7% 45.5% 54.6% 
N 25 26 22 11 
Note. Percentage of respondents reporting various 













EVOLUTION OF LEGAL ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS, 
BUSINESS ETHICS BETWEEN 1982 AND TODAY 
 
Legal  








Got worse 12.0% 15.4% 
N 25 26 
 
FIGURE I 
Sample size against time 




























































Use of contract enforcement mechanisms 
















0 20 40 60 80 100 
percent 
Wait; do very little 
Find a new customer/supplier 
Go to court 
Use a lawyer to solve the dispute 
Threaten to take legal action 
Use an intermediary or a friend 
Use private arbitration 
Undermine the reputation of the client/supplier 
Request refund if advance payment used (suppliers only) 
Threaten to withold future supplies (w. clients)/Refuse payment (w. suppliers) 
Renegotiate terms of the contract 
Insist on the fulfillment of the contract (complain, remind, etc.) 










































How did you come to know your principal customer/supplier 
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Acquaintances as sources of information about customers/suppliers 
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Network map of Fassi families 
Note. An edge connects two nodes if 
there is a common surname in the two 
triplets of father’s, mother’s and spouse’s 
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Leveau, Rémy. Le Fellah Marocain : Défenseur Du Trône (The Moroccan fellah: defender of the 
throne). Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985. 
Li, John Shuhe. "Relation-Based Versus Rule-Based Governance: An Explanation of the East 
Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis." Review of International Economics 11, 4 (2003): 651-73. 
Macaulay, Stewart. "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study." American 
Sociological Review 28, 1 (1963): pp. 55-67. 
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities 
in the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. "The Role of Institutions in the 
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." 
Economics & Politics 2, 1 (1990): 1-23. 
Muna, Farid A. The Arab Executive. London: Macmillan, 1980. 
North, Douglass C. "Comments." In Communities and Markets in Economic Development, 
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